ABSTRACT is paper explores tracking and privacy risks on pornography websites. Our analysis of 22,484 pornography websites indicated that 93% leak user data to a third party. Tracking on these sites is highly concentrated by a handful of major companies, which we identify. We successfully extracted privacy policies for 3,856 sites, 17% of the total. e policies were wri en such that one might need a two-year college education to understand them. Our content analysis of the sample's domains indicated 44.97% of them expose or suggest a speci c gender/sexual identity or interest likely to be linked to the user. We identify three core implications of the quantitative results: 1) the unique/elevated risks of porn data leakage versus other types of data, 2) the particular risks/impact for vulnerable populations, and 3) the complications of providing consent for porn site users and the need for a rmative consent in these online sexual interactions.
INTRODUCTION
One evening, 'Jack' decides to view porn on his laptop. He enables 'incognito' mode in his browser, assuming his actions are now private 1 . He pulls up a site and scrolls past a small link to a privacy policy. Assuming a site with a privacy policy will protect his personal information 2 , Jack clicks on a video. What Jack does not know is that incognito mode only ensures his browsing history is not stored on his computer. e sites he visits, as well as any third-party trackers, may observe and record his online actions. ese third-parties may even infer Jack's sexual interests from the URLs of the sites he accesses. ey might also use what they have decided about these interests for marketing or building a consumer pro le. ey may even sell the data. Jack has no idea these third-party data transfers are occurring as he browses videos.
His assumption that porn websites will protect his information, along with the reassurance of the 'incognito' mode icon on his screen, provide Jack a fundamentally misleading sense of privacy as he consumes porn online. e above hypothetical scenario occurs frequently in reality and is indicative of the widespread data leakage and tracking that can occur on porn sites. In 2017, Pornhub, one of the largest porn websites 3 , received 28.5 billion visits, with users performing 50,000 searches per second on the site (Pornhub, 2018) . Statistics vary as to the amount of overall porn activity on the internet, but a 2017 report indicated porn sites get more visitors each month than Net ix, Amazon, and Twi er combined, and that '30% of all the data transferred across the internet is porn, ' with site YouPorn using six times more bandwidth than Hulu (Kleinman, 2017) . While there is much scholarly a ention on internet use and privacy in general, there has been less research on the speci c privacy implications of online porn use. Considering that porn websites are among the most visited on the Internet (Alexa, 2018b) , it is imperative to a end to the speci c privacy concerns of online porn consumption. Most crucially, porn consumption data is sexual data, and thus constitutes an especially sensitive type of online data users likely wish to keep private.
Revelations about such data represent speci c threats to personal safety and autonomy in any society that polices gender and sexuality. In this article, we demonstrate through the study of 22,484 pornography websites that people who visit such sites may have their sexual interests inferred by third-parties that surreptitiously track web browsing, o en without user notice or consent. We provide quantitative results that reveal extensive privacy issues on pornography websites and highlight three core implications of our ndings: 1) the unique and elevated risks of porn data leakage versus other types of data, 2) the targeting of 'di erence' and the likelihood that the tracking of sexual data will especially impact vulnerable populations, and 3) the complications of giving consent to data collection and tracking for porn site users, and how these problematic understandings of consent mirror more general misconceptions and power imbalances of interpersonal sexual consent.
community. is has particularly been true for those whose sexual interests are deemed deviant or abnormal, and thus must be explored privately. Gross (2001: 221) explains, '..sexual images and stories have generally been o cially condemned while privately enjoyed. ey also have o ered channels for the vicarious expression and satisfaction of minority interests that are di cult, embarrassing, and occasionally illegal to indulge in reality. . . ' Porn can provide community for those in areas hostile toward their identity (Gross, 2001) . Despite online porn's a ordances for community, it remains tied up in extant issues around power, agency and representation in traditional porn industries (Mowlabocus, 2010) .
We center private access to online porn as important to a queer, feminist, sex-positive politics of gender and sexuality, and central to community-building and free and safe sexual expression: e existence of these sexual images is a threat to those who guard the ramparts of the sexual reservation. Visible lesbian or gay (or any unconventional) sexuality undermines the unquestioned normalcy of the status quo and opens up the possibility of making choices that people might never have otherwise considered. (Gross, 2001: 223) When sex acts and identities are labeled abnormal or normal,all are vulnerable. Sloop (2004: 8) notes 'sex positive' means, "to think of sexual practices and sexuality as being organized into systems of power that must be transgressed if we are to undermine the constraining dimensions of culture on our behavior," and, according to Smith and A wood (2014: 13) is ". . . o en associated with opposition to the regulation of sexual practices, the censorship of sexual representations and restrictions on sex education. " Herein, we take such a 'sex positive' view of porn and access to online pornography. While acknowledging the many racist, misogynistic, heteronormative and other problematic histories and themes in pornography and its production, distribution and consumption 4 , our work recognizes the ubiquity and permanence of porn and its many uses and social functions, and the danger of societal, state, and institutional narratives that might work to discipline gender and sex.
Researchers are learning the many uses of porn, complicating simplistic notions of what porn is 'for.' Porn consumption does not necessarily equate to sexual identity, preference, pleasure, interest, or fetish. For example, one may consume gay porn but not identify as gay. Barker (2014: 149) notes the "rich variety" of reported reasons for viewing porn, including: "for reconnection with my body, to get in the mood with my partner, for recognition of my sexual interests, to see things I might do, to see things I can't do, to see things I wouldn't do, to see things I shouldn't do, for a laugh. . . ," and more. Sexual playfulness is an important means of exploring changing pleasures and preferences outside of strict categorizations of identity that can stigmatize some interests (Paasonen, 2018; Tiidenberg and Paasonen, 2018) . us, when we note a porn site or user's 'sexual interest' or 'sexual data' is revealed or could be inferred in tracking porn site visits, we do so with the knowledge that porn serves a variety of uses and content consumed does not explicitly indicate a person's sexual or gender identity, interest, desire, or a nity 5 . Further, the site URLs o en suggest speci c genders and/or sexual preferences, genres, and acts found in the site content. However, we believe if individuals' porn use is involuntarily exposed, such nuanced, sex-positive understandings of porn and sexual interest will likely not gure into many outside readings of user activities. us, we center the ability to privately consume online porn as a right to sexual privacy, which Citron (2019 Citron ( : 1898 Citron ( , 1901 notes, "is concerned with sexual autonomy,selfdetermination, and dignity. . . " and ". . . the extent to which others have access to and information about people's . . . sexual desires, fantasies, and thoughts. . . "
Online Tracking and Privacy
Although users may perceive a website or app as a single entity (o en the address in their browsers), many sites and apps include code from other parties of which users are typically unaware (Libert, 2015) . Such "third-party" code can allow companies to monitor the actions of users without their knowledge or consent and build detailed pro les of their habits and interests. Such pro les are o en used for targeted advertising, for example, by showing ads for dog food to dog owners (Turow, 2012) . Many websites and apps have revenue sharing agreements with third-party advertising networks and gain direct monetary bene t from including third-party code (Turow, 2012) . However, tracking users on websites without advertisements can provide additional insights into their habits, and online advertising companies like Facebook and Google o er web developers a range of "free" non-advertising services subsidized by allowing these companies to track users (Libert, 2015) . For example, a developer may include the Facebook "Like" bu on on a website to facilitate sharing content, which allows Facebook to track the activities of all visitors -Facebook users or not. Decades of research have demonstrated a variety of types of third-party tracking are endemic on both web and mobile devices (Felten and Schneider, 2000; Krishnamurthy and Wills, 2006; Libert, 2015; Englehardt and Narayanan, 2016; Binns et al., 2018) . e impacts of this tracking extend far beyond selling dog food. A signi cant body of literature has addressed the social implications of online consumer surveillance, including users' a itudes about being tracked (Barth and de Jong, 2017; Custers et al., 2014) , the mechanisms behind data mining and tracking (Kennedy, 2016) , how developers de ne and design for privacy (Greene and Shilton, 2018) , and surveillance as a technology of control within capitalism (Campbell and Carlson, 2002) . Collecting and tracking data are o en framed as ways to 'know' quantitatively unknowable and o en morally charged constructions like who or what is 'average, ' 'normal, ' or 'healthy' (Ruckenstein and Pantzer, 2017: 408) . Indeed, van Dijck (2014: 198) states that 'dataism' demonstrates, "widespread belief in the objective quanti cation and potential tracking of . . . human behavior and sociality. . . (and) also involves trust in the (institutional) agents that collect, interpret, and share (meta)data. . . "
Despite the normalization of tracking, survey research consistently demonstrates that users do not enjoy being tracked online (Cranor et al, 2000; Turow et al, 2015a) . Nissenbaum (2010: 2) argues, "What people care most about is not simply restricting the ow of information but ensuring that it ows appropriately. " Privacy policies, the primary means for users to learn about tracking, have been consistently found inadequate due to users not understanding their purpose (Smith, 2014) , di culty understanding the dense legalese in which they are wri en (McDonald and Cranor, 2008) , and that such policies fail to disclose 85% of observed instances of third-party tracking (Libert,2018) . Despite this, the online advertising industry asserts users can "opt-out" of such tracking under a self-regulatory framework referred to as 'notice and choice' or 'notice and consent' (Baruh and Popescu, 2017) . While some point to a 'privacy paradox' between users' expressed privacy preferences and their actual behaviors, one compelling explanation is that 'notice and consent' is so confusing users are unable to 'opt-out' even if they wish to do so (Smith, 2014) . It is important to note the new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in the European Union is designed to curb the practices described above by forbidding many forms of third-party tracking without a rmative consent from users (Libert and Nielsen, 2018) . However, the GDPR does not apply world-wide and its impacts are not yet clear.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
is paper aims to ascertain the potential for surveillance and tracking of pornography website visitors and their associated sexual data. Further, it explores theoretically-informed implications of data leakage, tracking, and other security concerns related to privacy and online pornography consumption. Although we use a global sample of porn sites (loaded in the U.S.), and will note at points in this article where global contexts might be especially relevant, we approach this project from a U.S.-based culture, policy, and privacy perspective. e research was conducted with the following research questions:
To what extent do pornography websites potentially reveal user data and allow for third-party identi cation and tracking? • RQ2: What entities/organizations tend to have the most access to this data? Do the sites' privacy policies disclose tracking and the organizations with access to their data? • RQ3: What is the potential for pornography website users' sexual interests to be revealed or inferred by such surveillance and tracking? • RQ4: What are the potential implications of porn website surveillance and tracking? What consequences for users can be drawn from the results, especially informed by theories of gender, sexuality and privacy, as well as relevant prior cases?
METHODOLOGY 4.1 Sample
In March 2018, we used a U.S.-based computer to analyze 22,484 pornography websites to identify the third-parties which may be able to infer users' sexual interests, and whether privacy policies provide a su cient vehicle for obtaining meaningful consent to tracking. To create our population of pornography websites, we downloaded the homepages of the one million most popular websites identi ed by the Alexa service 6 . Upon downloading the homepage, we extracted the page meta description information (a short summary of the page's content provided by the site developer) and page title. Our population of pornography websites is comprised of sites with 'porn' in the URL, meta description, or title of the page. 'Porn' functions as an excellent identi er as the text is rarely used outside of the context of pornography as very few words other than 'pornography' contain the le er sequence 'porn. '
Identifying ird-Parties on Websites
To identify third-parties found on a given website we used the webXray so ware platform. webXray 'is a tool for analyzing thirdparty content on web pages and identifying the companies which collect user data ' (webXray, 2018) . webXray functions by loading a given web page in the Chrome web browser. During the page load, webXray records all network tra c so that instances where user data is exposed to third-parties are identi ed. is network tra c is initially in a raw format and webXray 'uses a custom library of domain ownership to chart the ow of data from a given thirdparty domain to a corporate owner, and if applicable, to parent companies ' (webXray, 2018) . For example, if a given page initiates a request to the domain '2mdn.net', webXray will reveal that the page hosts code from DoubleClick, a subsidiary of Google, which is in turn a subsidiary of Alphabet. webXray also records data on all cookies set in the browser during page loading. Overall,webXray provides ample data from which to investigate the nature and scope of tracking on popular pornography websites.
Extracting and Analyzing Privacy Policies
is study examines the role of consent in online tracking and we conducted an additional analysis of site privacy policies using policyXray, a companion program to webXray (Libert, 2018) . Once a webXray analysis is completed, policyXray is used to locate the privacy policy of a given page by searching for links containing text such as 'privacy' and 'privacy policy'. policyXray then loads the privacy policy page in the Chrome web browser, injects the Mozilla Readability.js library into the page, and extracts the page's policy (Libert, 2018 ). e extracted policy is then analyzed to determine reading di culty, time needed to read the policy, and if the thirdparties detected collecting user data on the website are disclosed in the policy.
policyXray searches not only for the identi ed owner of a given tracker, but the parent companies as well, meaning the policy of a page which initiates a request to '2mdn.net' will be searched for 'DoubleClick,' 'Google,' and 'Alphabet.' Likewise, policyXray accounts for spelling variations so that both 'DoubleClick' (one word) and 'Double Click' (two words) are searched. Overall, policyXray is designed to give as many chances as possible for disclosure to be counted and is intentionally generous in this regard (Libert, 2018) .
Content Analysis of Domain Names and 'Sexual Interest'
To determine the extent to which the domain names of sites in the sample could alone appear to reveal speci c sexual/gender preference, identity, or sexual topic of interest of the site content or a site user, we conducted a content analysis of the site URLs. Content analysis is used for making valid and replicable inferences from texts to their context (Krippendor , 1980) . It is a useful method to employ when an individual investigator's reading of a text proves inadequate (Holsti,1969) . We drew a representative random sample of 378 site URLs from the larger population of 22,484. Con dence Level for the sample was 95% with a Con dence Interval of 5. We used four coders from diverse backgrounds: one primary researcher and three volunteers. ree coders were women (one identi ed her sexuality as uid; the others as queer), and one was a heterosexual man. Coders were trained using a code book with guidelines and examples for coding Presence or Absence of words or phrases that 'reveal or strongly suggest to the average user' one or more speci c gender/sexual identities or orientations, or topics of interest or focus. e 'Presence'/'Absence' categories were dened a priori based on theoretical understandings of gender and sexuality. Coders were instructed to code Presence for: 'Any word or phrase that indicates or suggests the porn content will feature a speci c gender or sexual identity, orientation, or preference 7 ,' and/or 'Any word or phrase that indicates or suggests the porn content will feature a speci c sexual focus, body part or type, identity or character (like race, nationality, ethnicity,religion, profession), act, fetish, interest, porn genre, porn trope, etc. 8 ' Coders were instructed to code Absence indicating: '…the domain does NOT reveal or strongly suggest to the average user one or more speci c gender or sexual: identities or orientations, and/or topic(s) of interest or focus. Instead, the domain indicates generic porn/adult themes. . . 9 ' De nitions and examples were wri en to render masculinity and heterosexuality visible and thus not reinforced as normative 10 . During the 45-minute training, disagreements between coders were discussed until consensus was established; the code book was revised accordingly. All coders completed coding in less than one hour, minimizing concerns of coder fatigue. Krippendor 's alpha, a measure of reliability among coders, was .86, which falls within an acceptable range (Krippendor , 2010) .
Limitations
While we use a robust methodology, no study is without limitations. Regarding the construction of our list, while it is the largest number of pornography websites to be studied in the context of web tracking, it does not include all such websites, and due to the opaque nature of the Alexa list it is impossible to quantify how reliable the sample is overall. e Alexa list is used widely in the literature and thus our study inherits a common weakness. Regarding measuring Wimmer and Dominick (2011:159) note ndings: "are limited to the framework of the categories and the de nitions used in that analysis. Di erent researchers may use varying de nitions and category systems to measure a single concept". We worked to account for our theoretical and political positionality in the de ning of categories to make more transparent these researcher in uences.
FINDINGS
Our March 2018 analysis successfully examined 22,484 sites drawn from the Alexa list of one million most popular websites where the URL, page title, or page description includes 'porn. ' We found third-party tracking is widespread, privacy policies are di cult to understand and do not disclose such tracking, and third-parties may o en be able to infer speci c sexual interests based solely on a site URL.
ird-Party Tracking
Our results indicate tracking is endemic on pornography websites: 93% of pages leak user data to a third-party; the pages that leak data do so to an average of seven domains; 79% have a third-party cookie (o en used for tracking); of the pages with cookies, there is an average of nine cookies; and only 17% of sites are encrypted, allowing network adversaries to potentially intercept login and password details. 11 We identi ed 230 di erent companies and services tracking users in our sample. Such tracking is highly concentrated by a handful of major companies, some of which are pornography-speci c. Of Figure 1 illustrates data ows between ve of the most popular porn websites and several third-parties. e majority of non-pornography companies in the top ten are based in the U.S., while the majority of pornography-speci c companies are based in Europe. One reason may be di ering cultural and commercial norms towards sexual content. In the U.S., many advertising and video hosting platforms forbid 'adult' content. For example, Google's YouTube is the largest video host in the world, but does not allow pornography. However, Google has no policies forbidding websites from using their code hosting (Google APIs) or audience measurement tools (Google Analytics). us, Google refuses to host porn, but has no limits on observing the porn consumption of users, o en without their knowledge. Table 2 is a breakdown of the use of Google services, and makes clear how Google's content policies have an impact on use for their services by pornography websites.
Privacy Policies
We successfully extracted privacy policies for 3,856 sites, 17% of the total. Major reasons for not extracting the policy of a given site are that it does not have a privacy policy, the link for the policy uses uncommon phrasing, or the structure of the page makes it di cult to extract a policy URL (as with a modal window). We found policies are wri en at a grade level 14 on the Flesch-Kinkaid scale, meaning two years of college are estimated to be needed to understand the policy. Policies have an average word count of 1,750 and take seven minutes to read (McDonald and Cranor, 2008) . Only 11% of third-parties observed tracking users on a given page are listed in the policy, indicating users may have no means to learn which companies might have troves of data about their porn use. e di culty of understanding a policy indicates those who do not have college-level education (and likely many that do), may be unable to give informed consent on pornography websites. Additionally, if the names of companies collecting user data are missing, it is impossible for users to consent to the use of their data for tertiary purposes.
Exposure of Sexual Interest
Based on a random sample, 44.97% 12 of porn site URLs expose or strongly suggest the site content includes or targets one or more speci c gender or sexual: identities or orientations, and/or topic(s) of interest/focus. To elucidate: these porn domains contain words or phrases that would likely be generally understood as an indicator of a particular sexual preference or interest inherent in the site's content, these might also likely be assumed to be tied to the user accessing that content. As example, some sites coded reliably across coders as exposing such interests include: 'h p://bestialitylovers.com,' 'h p://boyfuckmomtube.com,' and 'h p://hdgayfuck.com.' e remaining sites in the sample do not make easily discernible the type of content on the site. Examples of these 'generic' domains include 'h p://watch8x.com,' and 'h p://gohdporn.com.' While we reiterate speci c types of porn do not necessarily indicate user gender/sexual identity or interest, these results reveal the extent to which third-parties might assume users' speci c sexual characteristics based on sites visited. Venturing further into a site would provide an even more complete understanding of the content therein.
DISCUSSION
Below we present three primary implications drawn from the results. Each combines our ndings with theoretical and empirical grounding to make an argument related to sexual data and online porn. First, we argue porn data leakage represents a unique and elevated risk compared to many other types of data. We base this argument on our quantitative results that reveal a large majority of our sample leaked users' sexual data to third-parties, combined with the growing precedent for high-pro le, large-scale leaks, hacks, and missteps with sexual data. Next, we argue marginalized groups will likely be most targeted and harmed by such tracking. e extent to which gender and sexual interests could be inferred from site URLs demonstrates the troubling potential for the tracking and disciplining of sexual interests labeled non-normative. ere is precedent for such targeted abuse of women and other marginalized populations online, and we contend their susceptibility to technological a acks based on moral outrage point to wider societal vulnerabilities in the face of constantly shi ing socio-sexual norms. Finally, based on our privacy policy ndings, we argue porn sites and other industrial actors dealing in this data must acknowledge they are engaged in a transaction involving sex and power, and thus require a rmative sexual consent from users.
e Unique and Elevated Risks of Porn Data Leakage
Most crucially, our results reveal the wide-scale privacy and security risks of consuming online pornography. e high percentage of site URLs that may reveal speci c information about the content that users access constitutes an opportunity for the linking of this sensitive data to those users' other tracked online activities and pro les. Turow et al. (2015b) and Turow (2017) demonstrated 12 While 44.97% is alarming, the percentage may be even higher. Our 4 coders, although diverse, could not possibly be aware of all sexual terms and slang in the URLs analyzed. Likely some sites coded as generic actually contained references undetected by coders without niche knowledge. how the retail industries' tracking and pro ling of shoppers lead to discriminatory pricing practices and other privacy violations.
ose studies argue for the severity of the risks of such tracking. We contend that the tracking of online porn consumption represents an even riskier violation of privacy, in line with Citron's (2019 Citron's ( :1870 Citron's ( , 1881 argument that:
Sexual privacy sits at the apex of privacy values because of its importance to sexual agency, intimacy, and equality. We are free only insofar as we can manage the boundaries around our bodies and intimate activities… It therefore deserves recognition and protection, in the same way that health privacy, nancial privacy, communications privacy, children's privacy, educational privacy, and intellectual privacy do.
While perhaps less publicly discussed than retail tracking, in recent years porn and other sites related to sexual data have grabbed headlines as they became targets of a ack. In addition to the site URLs studied herein, porn websites store a plethora of customer information that, if the sites are hacked or if users are tracked online, could potentially reveal speci c users' private sexual data. Between 2012 and 2018, at least 12 porn sites, sites tied to non-consensual voyeurism, and sites for extramarital a airs were visibly breached (Hunt, 2018) . In some cases, these breaches caused signi cant harm to users and their families. e extra-marital site Ashley Madison su ered a prominent hack exposing 32 million names, credit card numbers, email and physical addresses as well as sexual interests of customers (Isidore and Goldman, 2015) .
e particularly sensitive nature of data collected by porn websites, combined with their comparatively lax security, can prove irresistible to hackers. In a 2012 porn site a ack, hackers said the site's mediocre security made it, 'too enticing to resist' (Geuss, 2012) . e hackers stole data of more than 73,000 subscribers including email addresses, passwords, usernames, and information from 40,000 credit cards (BBC,2012) . Earlier that year, YouPorn su ered a major breach, exposing thousands of user emails and passwords that promptly began circulating online (BBC, 2012) . A website related to more speci c sexual practices, Rosebu board.com, a forum about 'extreme anal dilation and anal sting' was hacked in 2016, resulting in more than 100,000 user accounts being exposed (Cox, 2016) . In 2018, thousands of users who accessed a bestiality website had personal details including email addresses, birth dates, and IP addresses circulated on public image boards by hackers (Cox, 2018) .
Malicious advertisements, delivered by the same types of thirdparties documented herein, have been found on many porn websites, including xhamster, Pornhub and xvideos (Lee, 2013) . One malicious ad, running on Pornhub's website for over a year, could take control of a victim's computer and click on other fake ads to generate income for those operating the scheme (Gri n, 2017). Although malicious ads can be found on many websites, on porn sites they are less likely to be reported by users based on the nature of their visit to the site. Tracking across the web elevates the risks, especially considering the large corporate entities we discovered can potentially access user data through third-party requests, such as Google and Facebook. Our results, combined with the precedent for large-scale data leaks of online sexual data, illustrate the unique and elevated risks associated with porn data leakage and tracking.
Targeting Di erence: Tracking Sexual Data and Vulnerable Populations
Our results indicate that the URLs of 44.97% of the 22,484 sites in our sample likely reveal a speci c gender/sexual preference, identity or interest related to the sites' content. We argue revelations about individuals' porn use and the speci c sexual content of sites they visit are unlikely to publicly be granted the nuance due humans' complex sexual interests, curiosities and identities 13 . is a ening is even more likely to occur online. As Marwick (2017: 180) noted regarding two prominent online sexual privacy controversies: '. . . the same properties of social media that facilitate activism and cultural participation can . . . enable networked abuse and targeted intimidation.' ose most likely to be impacted by online sexual privacy violations are traditionally marginalized and vulnerable communities, especially women, people of color, LGBTQ and other marginalized gender/sexuality communities, and those whose sexual interests are labeled deviant or abnormal in their community (Citron, 2019) . Sexual interests typically coded as (hetero)normative become invisible in the face of queer, 'deviant,' or 'alternative' interests marked as di erence (Butler, 1993) . at 'di erence' made visible against a constructed sexual 'norm,' makes certain groups most vulnerable to moralistic a acks based on sexual data. Plummer (2003: 57) explains, '…the "sexual citizen" . . . occupies a classed, ethnicized, gendered, and age-grouped position in society. at is, not all sexual citizens will be treated equally, fairly, in the same way. . . ' Franks' (2017: 431) notion of 'intersectional surveillance,' building on Crenshaw's (1989) foundational work on intersectionality, emphasizes that 'those subjected to multiple sources of subordination are also subjected to multiple sources of surveillance.' In what Banet-Weiser and Miltner (2016) call 'networked misogyny,' women are singled out for a disproportionate share of online abuse. 'Revenge porn, ' or non-consensual pornography, in which nude or 13 Many domains in our sample illustrate how quickly nuance might be lost in favor of exposure, panic and severe consequences. Sites like 'momboysex.ws,' 'freerapeporn.org, ' and 'pornwithanimals.net' would create scandal amid revelations they were frequented by a public gure, as well as personal/professional fallout for an ordinary citizen.
sexual photos or videos are spread without consent of the subject in order to intimidate and cause harm, has impacted at least 4% of U.S. internet users, or 10.4 million people (Lenhart et al., 2016) . Women and those who identify as lesbian, gay, or bisexual are the most frequent victims of revenge porn and other forms of online harassment and sexual privacy violations (Lenhart et al., 2016; Citron, 2019) . Chu and Friedland (2015: 3) explain that when women's privacy is violated and they are shamed online: ' e message is… you deserve no protection, no privacy. …Slut-shaming . . . blames the user-her habits of leaking-for systemic (networked) vulnerabilities. . . ' us, surveillance and exposure are deployed to discipline di erence.
Moral judgments can lead to devastating consequences for any sexual interests labeled 'immoral' (Warner, 1999: 5) , especially when these judgments are encoded into law. For example, same-sex relations between consenting adults are criminalized in 70 United Nations member states,with punishments ranging from imprisonment to death (Fox et al., 2019) . e consequences of sexual privacy violations in such contexts would clearly be severe. Even in societies with less regulation around sex, breaches of sexual privacy o en have bodily stakes. In the U.S., the Ashley Madison hackers were motivated by moral judgments about the site's intended user-base: people (mostly men) seeking extra-marital a airs. In the breach, hackers threatened to release users' names, addresses, credit card transactions, and 'secret sexual fantasies' if the site was not shut down. When the hackers did publicly post the data, they claimed it was a public service exposing the 'fraud, deceit, and stupidity' of users looking to cheat on their signi cant others (Isidore and Goldman, 2015) . e data dump resulted in devastating outcomes for some users, including divorces, suicides, hate crimes, and extortion emails (Baraniuk, 2015; Segall, 2015) . With primarily heterosexual men as victims, here we see that di erence coded broadly, and deemed immoral, widens the landscape of vulnerability. Considering popular perceptions of porn consumption as a masculine practice, combined with the frequent online abuse of women, one could imagine the immediate moral dimension to data breaches exposing women's sexual porn consumption. And while marginalized groups are most at risk, their vulnerabilities point to wider implications for a society in which ostensibly private sexual data is accessible to the extent de ned in our results and combined with a growing precedent of technological a acks based on moral outrage and conditional understandings of the right to privacy.
Sex, Porn, and the Complications of Consent
We argue our ndings reveal troubling violations by porn sites (and other industrial actors trading in porn consumption data), of users' sexual privacy and autonomy. Porn website privacy policies are long, dense, di cult to understand, and only 11% of the third-parties observed tracking users on a given page are listed in the policy, leaving users ignorant of which organizations may be assembling catalogues of their perceived sexual interests. e potentially catastrophic and certainly o en violent consequences of past (and undoubtedly future) sexual privacy breaches are re ective of problematic norms of sexual consent in a patriarchal and heteronormative rape culture. e language of 'consent' is o en mobilized in online privacy policies and other legalese related to the use of personal data. Yet, our results point to parallels in the dubious understandings of consent seen in intimate sexual encounters and in online sexual activity. We argue both in-person and online sexual activity alike (including online porn consumption) must be conducted only when a rmative consent has been granted. In the case of private sexual data, such as that which leaks from porn websites, the limitations of the user's ability to consent are currently so egregious they create numerous opportunities for violence, blackmail, and discrimination, and constitute a clear and present danger to those who consume online pornography. In interpersonal interactions, sexual consent is o en mistaken to mean 'no means no, and silence means yes.' However, policy makers are increasingly working to (re)de ne sexual consent as necessarilya rmative: silence does not equal consent, someone must communicate their consent for true sexual autonomy. Further, Citron (2019 Citron ( : 1882 notes, 'Consent facilitated by sexual privacy is contextual and nuanced -it does not operate like an on-o switch. ' In 2015, all New York schools adopted an a rmative de nition of sexual consent, stating: 'Consent can be given by words or actions, as long as those words or actions create clear permission regarding willingness to engage in the sexual activity. Silence or lack of resistance, in and of itself, does not demonstrate consent' (Delamater, 2015: 591) . Sexual consent is increasingly, and we believe usefully, conceptualized in this way.
In most U.S. online privacy policies consent is ideally, 'based on the idea that individual social media users make conscious, rational, and autonomous choices about the disclosure of their personal data' (Custers et al., 2014: 270) . However, the actual use of personal data usually does not live up to this ideal. O en websites (that somewhere contain a privacy policy) assume user consent to any potential outcomes of their use of the site, despite users not saying or doing anything signaling agreement. And indeed, most users interact very li le or not at all with privacy policies and tools for consenting to the use of personal data (Larose and Rifon, 2006; Custers et al., 2014) . 52% of Americans do not understand what a privacy policy is (Smith, 2014) . A nationwide survey found 65% of respondents mistakenly believed if a site contains a privacy policy, their information will not be shared without permission (Turow et al., 2015a) . In fact, there is no legal requirement in the U.S. for a website to have a privacy policy, and the mere existence of a policy does not mean user privacy is protected, only that users are informed of practices. In the U.S. it is perfectly legal to have a privacy policy explicitly stating porn browsing data will be sold.
us, consent online is at best opaque and misunderstood, and at worst, intentionally deceptive.
Sexual consent is carried out within systems of power, and consent becomes especially murky when there is a power imbalance between participants. Dougherty (2015: 238) argues consent is like a promise, and promises can 'protect individuals from imbalances of power within a relationship. ' Our results reveal a troubling power imbalance in the negotiation of users' private sexual data. Some of the world's largest and most powerful corporations have access to this data. Not only are users o en unable to truly give consent to the collection and use of their private sexual data; if an 'agreement' is breached, the power di erence between the user and corporation is so vast the user has li le recourse or protection. e similarities between online and o ine violations of consent have not gone unnoticed online where metaphors of sexual violence proliferate. Chun and Friendland (2015: 15) , citing internet culture examples like 'frape, ' '#rapeface, ' and 'pwned, ' argue the word 'rape' is increasingly popular online '. . . to suggest the possibility of online subjects dominating, violating, or transforming other online subjects.' e consequences of exposure of sexual data certainly imply the violence associated with such internet parlance. In the case of 'sextortion, ' in which people are blackmailed into performing sexual acts so a ackers won't release their sexual images/data, Citron (2019 Citron ( :1925 notes, 'victims have described feeling like they were "virtually raped. "' Alarmingly, regulators o en decline to act in the face of user vulnerability to privacy violations:
With the exception of certain forms of health and nancial information. . . companies continue to be free to collect huge streams of individuals' data. . . to construct pro les of individuals with the data, to share the data, and to treat people di erently. . . based on conclusions drawn from those hidden surveillance activities. (Turow et al., 2015a: 8) e reality of user vulnerabilities when consuming porn online, especially considering the leakage and data speci city identi ed herein, combined with our privacy policy results, lead us to argue that the ability to consent to the collection, use, or exposure of this personal sexual data constitutes a form of sexual consent. us, it ought to be as carefully considered, de ned, and regulated as interpersonal sexual consent 14 . Dougherty (2015: 227) argued a rmative consent is needed, 'in the case of high-stakes consent…with sexual consent as a paradigm of high-stakes consent. ' We can not imagine many online privacy concerns more high-stakes than those identi ed in this study, and so we argue users' a rmative consent should be obtained by porn sites holding such sensitive data 15 . As in any sexual interaction, silence must not be mistaken for consent, and individuals should have a clear understanding of the power dynamics of the sexual exchange they are entering when visiting porn sites, as well as the procedures for withdrawing consent. 16 
CONCLUSION
RQ1 asked to what extent porn websites reveal user data and allow for third-party tracking. We have demonstrated they leak data through third-party requests to a large and concerning extent. RQ2 asked who has access to the data and whether the access is disclosed in the sites' privacy policies. We have shown the data are o en accessed by large corporations, parties usually not identi ed in porn site privacy policies as having access to user data. RQ3 asked whether users' sexual interests might be revealed in the surveillance and tracking of porn usage. e user data o en suggests or reveals gender/sexual identities or interests represented in the porn site URL accessed, and thus poses an additional risk if tracked and assumptions about users' sexual identities/interests are 14 Interpersonal sexual consent, though more a ended to than the issues we highlight here, also remains poorly de ned and regulated (Citron, 2019) . 15 How such consent might be conceptualized, and ultimately, implemented, is beyond the scope of this article; we believe recognition of the stakes we've described can be a useful starting point. 16 See Custers (2016) on the need for expiration dates for online informed consent. linked to personal identifying information. RQ4 asked about the potential implications of porn website tracking and surveillance.
rough our results and connections to past porn site privacy and security breaches and controversies, we demonstrate that the singularity of porn data and the characteristics of typical porn websites' lax security measures mean this leakiness poses a unique and elevated threat. We have argued everyone is at risk when such data is accessible without users' consent, and thus can potentially be leveraged against them by malicious agents acting on moralistic claims of normative gender or sexuality. ese risks are heightened for vulnerable populations whose porn usage might be classi ed as non-normative or contrary to their public life. Finally, we argue porn sites currently operate with an unethical de nition of sexual consent considering the sensitive sexual data they hold. We contend the overwhelming leakiness and sexual exposure revealed in our results mean porn sites ought to be er account for user security as well as adopt policies based on a rmative consent.
Despite these risks, maintaining private access to online porn is crucial for all. Porn o en serves educational, exploratory and liberatory -or 'sex positive' -outcomes. When sexual 'norms' are potentially upheld and leveraged by the state or other agents, every citizen is ultimately at risk of being labeled 'non-normative' or pathological. Such online privacy risks and o ine bodily and reputational risks can lead to unequal power relations and the moving underground -and associated marginalization-of minority (a constantly in-ux and culturally-contingent category) sexual interests and identities. Others have theorized approaches to online and sexual privacy concerns that we nd useful and promising in light of our results 17 . And we recognize the theoretical and political power of Chun and Friedland's (2015: 3) contention that:
We need to ght for the right to take risks-to be in public-and not be a acked. . . . (and) by building new forms of interaction that cannot 'leak' because they do not seek to create imaginary bubbles of privacy between users in the rst place. However, our results reveal just how susceptible our sexual data is to accidental or hostile exposure and thus, to moral targeting, on-and o ine violence, and other negative consequences. Our data lend weight to Citron's (2019 Citron's ( : 1877 warning that, ' anks to networked technologies, sexual privacy can be invaded at scale and from across the globe.' While we should always work toward exposing the constructed and complex nature of 'normalcy' (Warner, 1999) , we have demonstrated an imperative to swi ly and pragmatically address and disrupt the current and ongoing widespread leakiness of online porn sites.
While the ndings of this study are far from encouraging, we do believe regulatory intervention may have positive outcomes. e form of consent currently found in U.S. self-regulatory 'optout' systems fails to meet sexual consent norms and reinforces the 'blame the victim' mentality that o en emerges in slut shaming and other forms of sexual violence. Scholars are not immune from 17 See Citron (2019) on sexual privacy, Plummer's (2003) concept of 'intimate citizenship, ' and Baruh and Popescu's (2017: 592) argument that regulatory e orts ought to 'recognize the nature of privacy as both a collective value and a collective social phenomenon,' rather than traditional individualist understandings of privacy selfmanagement. such a itudes as evidenced by the 'privacy paradox' which implicitly holds users responsible for privacy violations rather than the powerful actors conducting surveillance. In contrast, the European Union's GDPR formulation of online tracking consent more closely matches norms for sexual consent by emphasizing consent must be a rmative and freely given, thereby providing greater protections to users. Our results demonstrate the imperative to a end to outcomes of the GDPR and to develop models of a rmative digital consent for porn websites that meet the diverse requirements for providing and withdrawing consent in sexual interactions.
